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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL F'ARMERS UNION
PROPERTY AND· C:AS.UALTY C·O.,
a ·corporation,
Plaintiff arn'd Appellant,

Case No. 8286

-vs.~ELAND·

J. THOMPSON,
D-efendant and R.esp·ondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF'

NAT·URE OF THE CASE
This action arose under a fire insurance policy issued
by the plaintiff co;vering certain property located on a
tract of land in Box Elder County, Utah. The insurance
was intended to cover a frame dwelling, used as a garage,
for $2,000; an Allis Chalmers tractor for $2,000; and an
.Allis Chalmers combine for $2,000. (Exhibit P-3). The
premium for the p·olicy was $23.00 and the insurance was
to run from October 26, 1951, to October 26, 1952.
On or about the 26th day of October, 1952, the defendant renewed the policy for the period from October
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26, 1952, to October 26, 1953. On November 8, 1952, the
foregoing property was destroyed in a fire (R. 1-6). On
the 21st day of January, 1953, pursuant to a proof of loss
filed by the defendant (Exhibit P-2 and D-14 and 15),
the plaintiff paid to the defendant the sum of $2,000,
which was represented to be the value of the frame building. There was some question concerning the identity
of the· Allis Chalmers tractor and combine and no payment was made for these items at that time (Tr. 88-89).
During the course of the investigation concerning
the identity of the combine and tractor, it was discovered
that the defendant had sold the frame building prior to
the date of the fire, which sale the company had not been
informed of at the time the $2,000 was p-aid (R. 89-90).
It was further discovered that at the time the insurance
was originally p·rocured the defendant was not the owner
of the building and had certain encumbrances upon the
other prop·erty of which he had not advised the company.
IThe plaintiff thereupon brought an action against
the defendant to cancel the policy of insurance and torecover the $2,000 which had been paid (R. 1-3). The defendant answered and counterclaimed for the damage to
the tractor and combine '(R. 6-9). The case was tried to
a jury and submitted to them on special interrogatories.
On the basis of their answers to the interrogatories,
the court entered judgment for the defendant for the
damage to the tractor and combine plus interest (R. 72).
As. part of its judgment, the court entered a judgment of no cause of action on plaintiff's complaint (R.
2
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72), but specifically found that the value of the frame
building at the time of the fire was $1,000. The court
thereupon entered an additional order granting a new
trial on the plaintiff's complaint unless the defendant
should file his consent that the judgment on the counterclaim should be reduced $1,000, the consent to be filed
within ten days or by 5:00 P.·M. on April23, 19·54 (R. 73).
The defendant did not file his consent, and on Ap·ril
23, 1954, the court ordered a new trial as to plaintiff's
complaint, it appearing to the court:

"* * * That said defendant obtained $2,000 as
insurance from plaintiff on the representation
that the building was worth the sum of $2,000, at
the time of said fire when in truth and in fact
said building was only worth the sum of $1,000
at that time·; and it further appearing that this
court, after making a finding to the effect that
said building was only worth $1,000 at the time of
the fire, erred by not entering a judgment that
plaintiff recover the sum of $1,000 on its complaint, and it further appearing that the court
committed errors at law in the foregoing respects
and that the evidence was insufficient to support
the judgment, as entered, and other good cause
being shown," (R. 76).
Subsequently various motions were filed by the parties, and on October 13, 1954, the court entered an order
amending the findings by striking the finding "that the
value of the building at the time of the fire was One
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1,000.00) only." The
court further vacated its order for a new trial. In its
reply to the counterclaim of the· defendant, the plaintiff

3
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had admitted that the frame building had a value of
$2.,000. The court gave as one of its reasons for setting
aside the order for a new trial and amending the findings
that:
"The court did not have in mind the fact that
the parties, by their pleadings, had stipulated to
the value of said structure."
The questions presented by this appeal are then: Did
defendant have an insura;ble interest in the· frame building at the time of the fire~ Was the policy of insurance
void b·y reason of defendant's misrep·resentation as to his
ownership· of the building and his interest in the combine
and tractor~ When the evidence showed that the frame
building had a value of $1,000, could the court enter a
finding to that effect~ And did the court, having entered
an order granting a new trial, err in vacating that order
some months later~
'STATE·MENT' OF F AC:TS
It would appear that the facts can best be presented
by covering them in a chronological order.
On September 30, 1947, the defendant acquired the
frame building described in the insurance policy under a
"Vete-ran Farm Labor Housing Contract" wherein the
Box Elder County Farm Labor Association leased the
building to Leland J. ·Thompson for a consideration of
$225.00 and $20.00 for the fixtures. The Association
was to move the building onto the defendant's farm and
the defendant leased to the Association a plot of ground
on which the building was to be placed (Exhibit D-4, Tr.
4
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15). On October 26, 1951, the defendant applied to the
plaintiff for a fire insurance policy on the frame dwelling, the tractor, and the combine. The application for
the insurance was taken by a Nick H. Topik, who testified
that the application contained all the information given
to him by Mr. Thompson (Tr. 74-75). An examination
of the application, Exhibit D-10, reveals that Leland
Thompson was represented to be the owner of the
frame dwelling, the tractor and the com'bine. As has been
pointed out previously, Leland Thompson did not own
the frame dwelling at the time, but it was leased from the
Box Elder County Farm Association. Moreover, the defendant had a loan on the tractor from the F:arm Home
Administration, the original amount of which was $2,500,
of which nothing had been said to the agent (Tr. 74-75),
and which did not appear in the application for the fire
insurance policy (Exhibit D-10).
The plaintiff issued a fire insurance policy covering
the above described ·building and items of equipment
showing Leland J. Thompson as the insured, and not
showing any encumbrances on the building or the other
items of equipment (Exhibit P -3). The term of the policy
was from October 26, 19·51, to October 26, 1952. The
policy insured each of the items for $2,000 and contained
the provision that the company "does insure: Leland
J. 'Thompson and legal representatives, to the ext,ent of
the actual cash value of the property at the time of loss."
The policy contained the further provisions:
''The entire policy shall be void if, whether
before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully

5
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c?ncealed or n1isrepresented any material fact or
Circumstance concerning this insurance or the
subject thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing
by the insured relating thereto."
And
''The insured shall give immediate written
notice to this Company of any loss, protect the
property from further damage, forthwith separate
the damaged and undamaged personal property,
put it to the best possible order, furnish a complete inventory of the destroyed damaged and
undamaged property, showing in detail quantities, cost, actual cash value and the amount of
loss claimed; and within sixty days after the loss,
* * * the insured shall render to this Company
a proff of loss, signed and sworn to by the insured, stating the knowledge and belief of the
insured as to the following: The time and origin
of loss, the interest of the insured and all others
in the p,roperty, the actual cash value of each
item thereof and the amount of loss thereto, all
encumbrances thereon, all other contracts of insurance, whether valid or not, covering any of
the property, any changes in the title, use, occupation, location, possession or exp.osures of
said property since the issuing of this policy."
·On December 8, 1951, the defendant sold the real
property on which the frame building in question was
located to John M. Hardy and his wife. (Tr. 17). As to
whether the building was to be part of the sale, defendant
testified starting on page 23 of the transcript:

"Q. I said did you sell the barracks building
which was burned in the fire to Mr. Hardy along
with the land on D·ecember 18, 1951?
6
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"A. The house was to go along with the
deal, but Mr. Hardy understood that the title
wasn't clear on the building and was to be turned
over to him at the time it was cleared up with the
Labor Association of Box Elder County.

* *

*

*

*

"Q. You sold your interest in the building to
Mr. Hardy at the time you sold the land, didn't
you~

"A. How could I sell it to him until the time
I got the deeds to it~
"Q. Well, you sold him what part you owned
in it, if anything. Did you own anything in the
building at that time~
"A. I didn't own only my interest in it.
''Q. Did you sell Mr. Hardy your interest at
that time, Mr. Thompson~
''A. The only thing I'll sa.y is that it was to
go along with the deal.
"Q. By that do you mean when it was to go
along, that Mr. Hardy was to acquire your interest
in the deal; is that what you mean~
"A. He was to acquire the building along
with the land."
On that same point, Mr. J'ohn M. Hardy testified on
page 140 of the transcript :

"Q. Where and when was this barracks
building discussed between you as to its being
concerned in the deal~
"A. Well, at the time we were dealing on the
place.
"Q. Now, what was said with respect to this
barracks building~
7
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"A. Well, I had an option of buying it with
or without the barracks on.
"MR. HANSON: Bying the land with or
without; is that what you mean~
"A. Buying the land with or without the
barracks on it, and we done quite a bit of corresponding on that.
"Q. And when the deal was finally consummated, did you take it with or without~
"A. I was to get the building with the place.
"Q. How did you pay for the place~
"'A. I assumed a mortgage on it and paid
Mr. Thompson for his equity."
As to the price paid for the building, the defendant
testified on p·age 47 of the transcript:

"Q. * * * Now, taking you back again to the
time that you had the negotiations with Mr. Hardy
about the sale of the prop·erty or the land, did
·Mr. Hardy pay you anything additional for the
building other than your equity in the land~
"A. He paid me the price that we agreed on
the whole thing.
'' Q. Well, just tell me what it was. Did he
pay you anything additional for the building over
and above the p·rice of the land, and if so how
much~

''A. If he hadn't taken the building there
was sup·posed to be a thousand dollars less.

"Q. In other words, he paid you a thousand
dollars for the building; isn't that right~
"A. He paid me a thousand dollars for it
with the building on, yes."
8
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At the time the frame building was sold, Mr. Hardy
gave Mr. Thompson permission to use the building. ·On
that point Mr. Hardy testified beginning on page 140 of
the transcript:

Q. Now, then, was anything said about Mr.
Thompson's use of that barracks building~
"A. Yes.
"Q.

What~

·"A. He had his machinery there, and he
wanted to use the barracks until he could get his
machinery-he was talking at that time of getting
another place and to move it up there. I told him
it was all right, because I had no occasion to use
the building at that time.

'' Q. And that was before the deal was consummated; is that right?
"A. That's right."
On page 143 of the transcript, Mr. Hardy testified:

''Q. Now, after you had taken possession of
the rest of the place, did Mr. Thompson talk to
you any further about holding onto this barracks
'building longer, or otherwise about it?
"A. Yes, he did.
"Q. Was there any further discussion about
that before you closed the deal?
"A. Well, right at the time we were talking
about it, and he said he wanted possession. I said
I had no occasion to use the building, it was all
right at that time for him to go on and use it until
he could move the machinery.

"Q. And it was there after you told him that
9

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was all right for hin1 to continue to use it there;
was there anything further said at the time you
closed the deal~
"A. Not at that time.
"Q. That was the entire deal with respect to
the building at that time~

"A. As I remember it. I had no occasion to
use the building, and he wanted to use it, and it
was p·erfectly all right with me at that time when
we were talking about the deal."
On cross-examination, Mr. Hardy was asked at page
146 of the transcript :

"Q. If you wanted to make any use of
the building other than putting machinery where
Mr. Thompson had his, you would have done so,
wouldn't you~
"A. Well, as I

~stated,

I had no_ occasion to.

"Q. If you had occasion, you would have done
so~

"A. Yes, but I don't" Q. If you had had any reason, for instance,
to put some hand tools or to store something in
the p~art of the building not occupied by the machinery, you would have gone down and done it,
wouldn't you~

''A. I suppose anybody would have done that.
"Q. You were just allowing Mr. Thompson
to keep the machinery in there rmtil it was sold?

"Q. Isn't that so'
''A. 'That's how farmers works. S-ure it is."

10
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On the question of whether anything was paid for
the privilege of storing the equipment in the building,
the defendant told John P. Gatfield, the person who investigated this loss, that there was nothing said between
Mr. Thompson and Mr. Hardy in respect to any rental
or any kind of a charge for this convenience. On or about
October 15, 1952, after the defendant had sold the building, the defendant mailed a check for $19.60 (Exhibit
D-7) to the Company with a renewal premium receipt
extending the coverage afforded by the policy to October
26, 1953 (R. 41). At the same time, the defendant claims
that he mailed a letter (Exhibit D-6) informing the Company that he had sold the building.
Milo M. Jensen, claims manager for the plaintiff,
testified that he had examined the file on Mr. Thompson's
insurance policy and that he did not find any letters or
letter like Exhibit D-6 in the file; that the Company did
not know that the building had 'been sold to Mr. Hardy
until the summer of 1953 when they got a report to that
effect from the adjusting firm in Salt Lake City telling
the Company that they had just learned that Mr. Thompson was not the owner of the building (R. 53). Mr. Jensen
testified further that it was the practice of his Company
upon receiving such a notice to contact the owner and
have him execute an assignment of the policy to the new
owner (P-16).
On November 8, 1952, the fire occured in which the
property concerned was either totally destroyed or
damaged.
11
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John P. Gatfield testified that he was employed by
the ·scott Wetzel Comp·any of Salt Lake City as an insurance adjuster and that he investigated this fire loss
( Tr. 88). He testified that in the course of his investigation, he had difficulty in correlating the numbers on the
equip·ment with the serial and motor numbers on the insurance policy, but that the claim for the loss of the
building itself was paid at the insistance of Mr. Topik
and Mr. Thomp'son (R. 189).

He firs~t learned of

the sale of the frame building about two or three weeks
after the insurance company had issued their draft for
$2,000 through another insurance comp·any in the course
of their investigation, the other insurance company having had insurance on a. Mack truck which was stored in
the building. He then arranged for an interview with
Mr. Thompson, in which Mr. Thompson told him that he
had sold his farm and that the building had 'been include'd
in the sale (Tr. 90). At that time Mr. Thompson never
mentioned anything about having given notice to the
company of the sale of the ·building (Tr. 91). On January
31, 1953, Leland Thompson received the bill of sale to
the frame dwelling from the Box Elder Farm Labor
Association (Exhibit D-5). On July 31, 1953, the plaintiff started its action to recover the $2,000 paid for the
frame building and ·at the beginning of the trial tendered
to the defendant the return of the insurance policy premium paid as a renewal of the policy from October 26,
1952, to October 26, 1953 ( Tr. 1).
12
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STATEMEN'T OF: POINTS
POINT I. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME DWELLING AT
THE TIME THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS RENEWED OR
THE LOSS OCCURRED.
POINT II. ASSUMING DEFENDANT DID HAVE AN
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME BUILDING, THE
LIMIT OF HIS RE.COVERY FOR THE LOSS THEREOF IS
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FRAME BUILDING.
POINT III. THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS VOID BY
REASON OF DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN VACATING ITS
ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE AN
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME DWELLING AT
THE TIME THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS RENEWED OR
THE LOSS OCCURRED.

The applicable Utah Statute, Section 31-19-4, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, provides:
" (1) No contract of insurance on property or
on any interest therein or arising therefrom, shall
be enforcible except for the benefit of persons
having an insurable interest in the things insured.
"(2) 'Insurable interest' as used in this Section means any lawful and substantial economic
interest in the safety or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction
or pecuniary damage."
We have not been able to find a decision where the
13
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courts have construed the words "substantial economic
'
interest".
That an insured must have an insurable interest at
the time he takes out a contract of insurance and at the
time of loss is basic. Otherwise, 'the contract, rather than
.being an agreement to indemnify the insured for any
loss he might suffer, becomes a mere gambling contract
wherein the assured stands to gain upon the happening
of a certain event. As is said in Volume 4 of Applemwn's
Insurance Law and Practic;e, at page 99·:
"The insured must be the owner of the prOperty at the time he takes out the insurance and at
the time of loss, by the majority rule, and however defective such allegations of interest may be,
they must be proved. Nor can the character of
the insured's interest be changed between the date.
of insurance and the date of loss without the
'Consent of the insurer.
"A fire contract, or other property insurance,
is considered a personal contract in that the hazards which the comp·any elects to assume are
hazards concerned with the contracting individual
-his character, moral qualities, and the like-the
insurance running to the individual rather than
upon the property. If the insured, then, parts
with an interest in the property prior to loss, it
is not covered. It is not necessary to have a
specific by-laws to the effect that a transfer or
sale of the property avoids p·rotection; a sale by
the insured between the date of the policy and
the date of the loss is considered to avoid protection."
As we have seen from the evidence· the defendant,

14
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Leland J. Thompson, conveyed his entire interest in the
frame dwelling, which was the subject of the insurance
policy in this case, to J'ohn M. Hardy. The most that
can be said was that Leland Thompson had permission
from Mr. Hardy to keep his equipment in Mr. Hardy's
building, which permission could have been withdrawn
at any time. No consideration was paid for the privilege.
Did the mere privilege or license to store the machinery in the building constitute a" substantial economic
interest," when it was revokable at any time by the owner
of the building~ Of course, the argument will be made
that Leland J. Thompson was the bailee or had possession of the building. This, however, is not borne out by
the evidence which shows that the land on which the
building was located and the building itself had been
conveyed to John M. Hardy and was completely within
his possession and control. This is further borne out by
the fact that the defendant considered it necessary to
secure Mr. Hardy's permission to keep the equipment in
the building, and further the evidence shows that Mr.
Hardy was free to use the building and to store his own
tools and machinery therein.

In Fidelity & Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v.
Raper, 6 So. (2d) 513 (Ala.) a sublessee erected a building on land without the permission of the lessor. There
was no permission relative to placing improvements on
the land. The court held that the building became the
property of the original lessor and the person who
bought the building from the sublessee had no insurable
interest. The court said:

15
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"On these uncontradicted facts, plaintiff, if
he had an interest at all, is merely a trespasser
tenant by sufferance; that is to say, the· plaintiff had no right which he could enforce so far as
the building was concerned and he could have
been arrested at any time. He did not even have
the right of p·ossession except as a squatter or
trespasser would have.

o:

"The law is clear that a person with no interest in land other than that of a tenant by 'Sufferance, or trespasser, has no insurable interest in
the property."
In IG.anefsky v. National Commercial Mutual Fire
Ins. Co., 35 Atl (2d) 766 (Penn.), where a person was in
possession of prop·erty under an unenforcible parol contract to convey the property to him, the "unconditional
and sole ownership'' of the policy in said
"Insura'ble interest in property imparts an
interest which can be enforced at law or in equity."
In Pric,e v. United Pacific Casualty Co., 56 Pac~ (2d)
116, (Ore.), under a burglary policy providing that insurance should ap·ply to all property owned by husband
or any p·ermanent member of his household, the husband
was held without an insurable interest in a diamond ring,
and hence not entitled to maintain an action on the policy
for theft of the ring for his own benefit. ·Says the court:

Insurable interest in property is created only
through ownership, rightful possession, acquisition of lien, or in a similar manner, and cannot
be created through contract between insured and
insurer, since such contract would be a mere
wagery agreement."
16
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Holm.e.s v. Grange Fr,at.ern.al Fire Insura.nc.e Association, 228, Pac. (2d) 889· (Cal.), held :
''Where fire insurance policy issued by defendant Fraternal Fire Insurance Association was
issued to plaintiff's hus·band on realty which he
contracted to purchase prior to his marriage, the
fact that property constituted wife's home at the
time the policy was issued and that she filed a
declaration of homestead gave her no title or insurable interest in property."

Sweeny v. Franklin Fire Insurance Company, 20
Pa. 337, (Penn.) held:
"One who was a stockholder and a creditor
of an unincorporated company which erected a
house on land belonging to the ·state of Delaware,
without license or shadow of title from the State,
had no insurable interest in the house, though he
claimed by relinquishment and transfer from
most of the stockholders to the creditors and was
in possession at the time of effecting the insurance
and at the time of the destruction of the premises.
"The rule is valuable and well-founded that
he who has no interest can have no insurance.
That he must show his interest and that is the extreme measure of his recovery are correlaries of
the rule, without this, insurance would soon become a mere system of gambling. These principles
are sufficient to affirm the judgment."
In Baldwin v. State Insurance Company, 15 N. W.
300 (Iowa), a son took a policy of insurance on property
belonging to his father with a view to prevent creditors
of his father from garnishing the fund in case of loss.
Said the court:

17
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"We come then, to inquire whether W. E.
Baldwin, son, can recover. He certainly cannot
recover for his own benefit. It is conceded he did
not suffer by the loss and has no beneficial interest in the policy. Can he recover for the benefit
of E. T. Baldwin (father)! To this proposition
we think it sufficient to say that the policy by
express terms limits the rights of recovery thereunder toW. E. Baldwin's interest in the property."
In Davis v. Bremer County Farmers Mutual Fire
Insur·anc:e Association, (Iowa) 134 N. W. 860, a policy
was issued May 22, 1908, to Mrs. William Blume, covering her dwelling house and farm buildings. On October
26, 1908, she sold the p-roperty to the plaintiff Davis,
and on November 13, 1908, she executed an assignment of
said policy to him, which assignment was consented to
by endorsement thereon by the secretary of the company.
On November 9, 1908, four days prior to the assignment,
the assured's p-roperty was destroyed by fire. The court
said:

"* * * The three elementary principles of fire
insurance which, working together, ·bring about
this inevitable result are, first, that a policy of
fire insurance is a contract of indemnity, and if, at
the time of the loss, the holder of the policy has
no right, title or interest to, or in the property insured, he cannot recover anything under his contract of insurance, where the damage to or destruction of the property results in no injury to
him; second, that the purchaser of the property,
taking it prior to the loss, is not a party to any
contract of insurance between the former owner
and the insurer, and therefore is not entitled to

18
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reeover under the con tract ; and, third, that the
contract of fire insurance, being personal in nature, cannot be transferred by the insured to another, save in accordance with the provisions of
the contract itself, involving the express or implied assent of the insurer, or a valid contract
of the insurer that it shall become liable to the
new owner. These elementary propositions are
not dependent on any stipulation, conditions or
limitations of the contract itself, but result from
the very nature of the contract, though, of course
they may be superseded or waived by the provisions in the contract, or by a new valid contract
or agreement subsequently made.

* *

* *

"The invalidity of the policy after the attempted transfer thereof by Mrs. Blume to the
plaintiff in connection with the conveyance of the
property was not the result of any forfeiture on
account of conditions subsequent, the contract of
insurance came to an end because the subject matter of the contract-that is, the insurable interest
of Mrs. Blume-had ceased to exist. * * *"
Thus it is seen that the plaintiff as a matter of law
was entitled to recover the $2,000 it had paid to the defendant by reason of the destruction of the frame dwelling. This is true regardless of any misrepresentation
on the part of Mr. Thompson, which we will discuss later,
and regardless of whether he notified the company, as he
claims, of the sale of the building. It is brought about
by the simple proposition that he had transferred any
interest he owned in the building to Mr. Hardy prior
to the date of the fire and, therefore, at the time of the
fire suffered no loss.

19
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POINT II. ASSUMING DEFENDANT DID HAVE AN
INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE FRAME BUILDING, THE
LIMIT OF HIS RE·COVERY FOR THE LOSS THEREOF IS
THE ACTUAL VALUE OF THE FRAME BUILDING.

Presupposing, for the purposes of discussion, that
the defendant did have an insurable interest in the frame
building, it is submitted that the limit of his recovery
for the loss is the actual value of the building. On this
point the defendant testified that he sold the land to Mr.
Hardy, who had the option of taking the land with or
without the building, and that he wanted $1,000 for the
building. It is also the testimony of John M. Hardy that
he p,aid the defendant $1,000 for the building.
It is true that in paragraph two of its reply to defendant's counterclaim, plaintiff admitted the value of
defendant's building was $2,000. However, in paragraph
four of the reply, it was alleged that the $2,000 was paid
out on the basis of a proof of loss submitted 'by the defendant. The whole theory of the plaintiff's complaint
was that defendant had misrepresented his interest in the
building and was not entitled to the $2,000, he had received. The court did find that the defendant had misrepresented the value of the building in the proof of loss
and that the value of the building was $1,000, and that
the defendant was entitled to only $1,000 of the $2,000 he
had received from the plaintiff for the destruction of the
building.
Viewed as a whole, it ap·pears that the defendant's
interest in the building and whether or not he was entitled to received the $2,000, was an issue in the law suit
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and therefore that the finding that he was entitled to
receive only $1,000 was within the issues raised by the
plaintiff.
Even were this not the case, it appears that the issue
as to the value of the building was tried without o·bjection
and by the express or implied consent of the parties,
and that this issue was therefore before the court even
though not alleged in the pleadings. Rule 1'5 (b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Proc;edur.e provides:
"When issues not raised 'by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings. s.uch amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform with the evidence and to
raise the issues may be made, upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to so amend does not effect the results of the
trial of these issues. Where evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in making his action
or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant
a continuance, if necess~ry, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence."
In this case, since the evidence carne from the defendant's own witnesses, it is difficult to see how he
would have been prejudiced by the evidence. Moreover,
no objection was made to the admission of this evidence
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and no request for any continuance was made.
In discussing Rule 15 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Practice and Procedure, which is the ·same as Rule 15
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Baro-n and
Holtzoff in their book on Federal Prac·tice arn.d Procedure, Vol. 1, at page 914, have this to say:
"Rule 15 (b) sanctions amendments to conform to the proof (1) when issues not pleaded
are tried by consent, expreS's or implied, and (2)
when evidence is objected to as not within the issues made by the pleadings, but the presentation
of the merits will be aided and the opposing party
not prejudiced by the amendment. * * *
''A motion to amend to conform to proof may
be made and granted at any time after presentation of the evidence has begun, and is frequently
allowed during the course of trial after the close
of testimony, and even after return of verdict, or
entry of judgment, or ap·peal or after remand.
* * *
"Amendments to conform to the p·roof are
permitted in order to bring the pleadings into
line with the issues actually developed at the trial
even though the issues were not adequately presented by the pleadings as originally drawn. Issues not raised by the pleadings which are tried
by the express or implied consent of the parties,
are treated in all respects as if raised in the original pleadings. A party impliedly consents to
the introduction of issues not raised in the pleading by failure to object to the admission of evidence relating thereto, unless he is not represented by counsel. * * *
"In accordance with the liberal policy ex22
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pressed in subdivision (b) the courts have exercised wise discretion in allowing amendments to
conform to pToof, even to the extent of permitting
recovery on a different theory of liability than
that on which the case was tried. In some cases
amendments have been allowed to set up new issues, interpose new defenses, or conform the
pleadings to the verdict of the jury.
"The right to amend to conform to proof is
necessarily dependent upon the individual facts
and circumstances, and the action of the court in
granting or denying such leave is not subject to
review except for abuse of discretion. Because of
the fact that an action may be finally disposed of
on a motion for summary judgment, if facts appear in an affidavit in support of thereof which
would justify amendment of the complaint, it has
been held that there may be grounds for treating
the complaint as though it were already amended
to conform to such facts. Formal amendment of
the pleadings is not always necessary as the court
may, if the evidence so warrants, consider them as
amended to conform thereto, and failure to file
amended pleadings subsequently does not affect
the result of the trial of issues consented to by
the parties. * * *"

As was said in Winrn v. Romney, 63 Utah 120, 222
Pac. 709:
"There is one other point of more or less significance vigorously urged by the plaintiffs. In
his original answer to plaintiff's complaint filed
September 25, 1922, three months before the trial,
defendant denied the existence of any trust whatever. This point is relied on as indicating the disingenuousness of defendant concerning the trust
alleged in his amended answer filed a few days
23

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before the trial. If this were the only point in the
case, the court would not be inclined to regard it
as of controlling importance. Pleadings are usually framed by attorneys, and clients ordinarily,
though sometimes imprudently, attach their signatures to pleadings proposed by their counsel
without careful scrutiny as to their actual contents. Besides this, eounsel oftentimes, especially
in the early pleadings of a case, misconceive the
real cause of action or defense and p·erhaps desire
to raise some technical questions, on its facts incompatible with the actual fact. For these reasons,
it would be unfair to always treat the statements
or denials in a pleading as binding admissions
when offered as evidence in the case."
The trial judge, after hearing all the evidence in the
case, was convinced as a matter of law that the. value of
the building was $1,000. Not wanting to invade the province of the jury and to substitute its opinion for that
of the jury, the court granted a new trial on plaintiff's
complaint unless the defendant should consent to a reduction of his judgment by $1,000. This was. a valid
exercise of the court's power to order a new trial on
the ground that the verdict was excessive. As has been
seen from an examination of the pleadings and orders in
the case, he later set aside the order for a new trial under
the misconception that he was bound by the plaintiff's
admission in his reply that the value of the building was
$2,000. As has been seen, his first action was correct.
What the defendant is now attempting to do is
recover $2,000 for a building admittedly worth only $1,000 because of what, at the most, is only a technical defect
in the pleadings. Granting for the purpose of this point
24
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only, that defendant had an insurable interest, justice
requires a decree that the finding that the building was
only worth $1,000 and that the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover $1,000 of the $2,000 already paid, he reinstated.
POINT III. THE INSURANCE POLICY WAS VOID BY
REASON OF DEFENDANT'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.

It appears from the evidence in this case that the
defendant, Leland Thompson, was guilty of misrepresentation in at least four respects: First, he· failed to
reveal the true ownership of the frame building or the
encumbrance on the tractor at the time he applied for the
insurance; ;Second, he failed to notify the company of
the transfer o.f his interest in the frame building to John
M. Hardy at the time the building was sold; Third, he
misrepresented the value of the building in the proof
of loss to be $2,000 and accepted the $2,000 check in payment for the same when according to his own testimony
he had sold the building for $1,000 some months earlier;
and Fourth, after the loss he misrepresented his interest
in the building both to the insurance adjuster and in the
formal proof of loss by concealing the fact that he had
sold the building some months prior to the actual loss.
The requirement that an insured disclose his interest
in the insured property is vital. As has been said in
Appleman in his work on Insurance Law and Practice,
Volume 4, beginning on page 298:
"If the insured has failed to disclose his title,
as required by a condition of the policy, or has
disclosed a false title, he cannot recover on the
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contract. The policy condition renders the contract void for failure to make such a disclosure,
it amounting to a concealment of a material fact.
And this is true though such failure was unintentional. A few cases, however, hold that unless
fraud was p:racticed, failure to disclose will not
affect the validity of the con tract.
"Even though no representation was made by
the insured, he ha.s been held to he under a duty
to see that all warranties are in prop·er form, and
even though the insurer may not have inquired into the state of the title or the insured may have
made no statement relevant thereto, a policy
clause stating that the contract shall be void if
the insured's interest is less than sole or unconditional ownership, controls. Many states have
held that by merely accepting a policy with such
a provision contained therein, the insured warrants the truth thereof. There have been holdings
to the contrary, however, particularly where the
insured is shown to have been ignorant of the
p-olicy conditions.
''Where the insured p~urports to state the
facts concerning title or ownership, he must state
them correctly, and any definite false statements
made relevant thereto or any positive misrepresentations, will avoid protection under the policy.
This is, of course, particularly true where the
misre-presentation was made with actual intent to
deceive, or it increased the risk of loss, but it ha.s
been stated that representation that the insured's
title is by deed does not imply that such ownership is perfect and unconditional.
"Where either a misrepresentation or concealment ap·pears as to the sole and unconditional
ownership provision, or as to title generally, the
26
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1najority of courts have held good faith or lack of
knowledge to be of no defense. Even lack of knowledge of such condition, or regarding it as nonessential, would not relieve the insured under
that rule. A few courts have held to the contrary
where no intent to deceive appeared, and the failure was not intentional and fraudulent.
"The reason for the adopting of such stringent rules by the majority of courts is that the
representation is considered highly material to the
risk.''
Much of the evidence of the defendant went to the
question of whether or not the misrepresentation of the
defendant was made in good faith. Whether the misrepresentation was made in good faith or not, the fact
that a misrepresentation was made avoids the policy.
As stated in 29 Am. Jur. on Insurance. at 425:
"The general rule is that in the absence of
statute, the fact that a misrepresentation was
made in good faith, or as a result of inadvertence,
mistake, negligence or ignorance, will not preclude it from being deemed material and a cause
for the avoidance of the policy procured in reliance upon it. If such a misrepresentation induces
the insurer to assume a risk which otherwise it
would not have taken, at least not at the premium
charged, there is a legal ground of avoidance and
actual fraud need not be establshed since it is not
a material factor in the avoidance of the contract
under such circumstances. * * *"
What is true as to the original policy is also true as
to the renewal. As is said on page 426 of the same volume:
"The general holding is that in the absence of
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a new application or anything showing a different
intention, the renewal of a fire insurance policy
is impliedly made on the basis that statements
in the original .application or policy are still accurate and operative."
The ease of Eklund v. Metropolit1an Life Iwsuranc.e
Co., 89 Utah 273, 57 Pac. (2d) 362, involved an action
on an industrial life policy. In her application for insurance the plaintiff had stated that she had not been under
the care of any physician within three years which was
not true. The court held the policy to be void and said:
"In the applications for insurance, as heretofore set out, the assured stated that she had never
been under treatment in any hospital; that she·
had not been under the care of any physician within three years; she declared that these statements
were true and complete and that any misrepresentations would render the policy void. These statements were false. Her application for the first
p·olicy was made N ovemher 2, 1933, less than a
month after the last day she had been treated by
Dr. Quick. The application for the second policy
was made the 31st of January, 1934, two days
after the assured had been treated by Dr. Tauffer
at the Salt Lake General Hospital. These statements which the assured made were material to
the risk. The policies were issued without physical examination of the assured. Whether the company would issue the policies was dependent upon
the answers of the assured. The utmost good faith
to answer truthfully was required of her. On the
assumptions that the statements in the applications were true, the policies were issued. By making the false rep-resentations, which the assured
did, the comp~any was misled to its prejudice.

28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Whether we class the statements made by the
assured as representations or warranties, the
same result is reached so far as the facts of this
case are concerned. If a representation is material
to a risk and likewise knowingly false, it will be
as potent for rescission of the contract embodied
in the policy as if the untrue statement was made
in form of a warranty (Numerous cases cited)."
Another point which the defendant attempts to raise
by the evidence in this case is that the defendant, although he· was not the owner of the property, held the
property for John M. Hardy, and therefore should be entitled to recover. While persons who hold property for
other persons might have a right to recover under such
a policy, a full disclosure of their interest is required.
"The holder of the naked legal title to property, who has no beneficial interest therein, has
been held not to be the sole and unconditional
owner within the meaning of a policy provision.
It has also been stated that property held in trust
or on commission must be insured as such or the
policy would be void. In applying such rules, the
courts have denied recovery to an agent for an undisclosed principal, where the policy provided the
insured had sole and unconditional ownership.
The same result has followed where principal
ownership is in the ward of insured. Thus, a suit
brought by the insured as trustee for his children,
alleging he held the property in trust for them,
has been held to have been properly dismissed.
''Property held in trust by the insured for a
church congregation is not owned by such insured
in compliance with such a policy requirement. And
where the insured, upon receiving the property,
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had given a written agreement to reconvey the
property if indemnified for certain liabilities for
which the property had been given as security,
his interest is that of trustee or creditor, which
must be specifically disclosed, where the policy
so provides. On the other hand, a grantor who has
conveyed such prop·erty in trust to pay debts to a
third p·erson has no such title as will enable him
to recover.

"It has been held that where the plaintiff
takes title to certain lots in trust for himself and
others, with the agreement that he is to manage
and sell the p·roperty and divide the proceeds, he
is not the sole owner of the lots. The same is true
where one holds property in trust for herself and
her sister." Vol. 4 Insurance Law and Practioe,
Applem.run, pages 323-4.
Nor should we lose sight of the insured's misrepresentation as to the equipment being free from any encumbrances as such a misrepresentation has the same effect as a misrepresentation as to the ownership. of the
frame dwelling. As is said in Volume 4, Insurwnce Law·
and Practio.e, A pplem,an, page 377 :
"A provision in a policy that the insurer shall
not' be liable if the property is encumbered is reasonable and valid rendering the contract void upon the violation of such condition. The insurer
has a right to stand on the terms of the policy and
refuse to pay any loss occurring.
"'The existence of a mortgage upon the insured property is generally considered material
to the risk, particularly if considered a warranty.
The hazard is considered to have been increased,
particularly if the insurer in accordance with the
30
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usual conduct of its business, would not have issued the policy had it lmown of the encumbrance.
Michigan stated bluntly that the existence of any
substantial encumbrance on property is a material
fact whether the statements of the insured are
made warranties or not. Missouri stated even
more flatly that it makes no difference whether
the concealment was material to the· risk. T·ennessee, however, has considered the failure to disclose
a lien or mortgage, is not a circumstance material
to the risk and will not avoid the policy.
"The acceptance by the insured of a policy
containing such a restriction as to encumbrances
is binding upon him, as he is considered to be
charged with knowledge of such condition. If
there is a definite and positive misrepresentation,
there is little question as to the result. Even
where no p·ositive representation is made however, this result might still be followed. * * *"
The policy in this case contained the provision:
"This entire policy shall be void if, whether
before or after a loss, the insured has wilfully
concealed or misrepresented any material fact or
circumstance concerning this insurance or the
subject thereof, or the interest of the insured
therein, or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto."
It also contained the following provision:
"The insured shall give immediate written
notice to this company of any loss * * * and within sixty days after the loss * * *, the insured shall
render to this company a proof of loss, signed and
sworn to by insured, stating the knowledge and
belief of the insured as to the following: The time
and origin of the loss, the interest of the insured,
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and of all others in the property, the actual cash
value of each item, etc."
There is no question that the insured has been guilty
of misstating his interest or concealing the interest of
others in the property which is the subject of this insurance. Moreover he has attempted to recover $2,000 for a
building on which he himself placed a value of $1,000.
Nor can there be any question that the ownership
of the building or other representations which were made
were material to the risk. There has been no attempt to
deny that the misrep,resentations were made and the only
evidence offered has been an attempt to explain why.
Such 'being the case, the entire contract should be held
to be void and the plaintiff to be entitled to recover the
$2,000 paid under the, policy.
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN VACATING ITS
ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL ON PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT.

The judgment on the special verdict in this-case was
entered on April 13, 1954. On that same date an order
was entered giving notice to the plaintiff that the court
would grant the new trial unless the plaintiff consented
on -or before Ap-ril 23, 1954, that the judgment on the
counterclaim should be reduced by $1,000 (R. 72-3). The
consent not having been filed on April23rd, an order was
entered granting a new trial (R. 76).
On September 28, 1954, the court gave notice that
he intended to enter an order vacating the order for a
new trial, and on October 13, 1954, six months after the
entry of the original judgment in this action, the court
32
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entered .an order vacating the order for a new trial and
amending the findings.
Rule 59 (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Prooedure,
which confers upon the court the power to grant a new
trial of its own motion, which was done in this case, provides:
"Not later than ten days after the entry of
judgment the court of its own initiative may order
a new trial for any reason which it might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in
the order shall specify the grounds therefor."
Thus it is seen that the court may not enter an order
for a new trial upon expiration of more than ten days
after the entry of the judgment. Rule 6 (b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in certain instances the court may extend the time in which certain
action may be taken, but expressly provides:
''But it may not extend the time for taking
any action under Rules * * * 59 (b), (d), and (e)
* * * except to the extent that under the conditions stated in them."
Provisions of these rules were adopted from the Federal Rules of Procedure and the specific provisions involved herein are the same. As to the power of the court
to grant a motion for a new trial after the ten day period,
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol.
3, page 241, have this to say:
"The ten day limit cannot be enlarged under
Rule 6 regarding enlargement of time. It applies
·as well to new trials granted on the initiative of
the court under subdivision (d) of this rule. The
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trial court may not of its own initiative grant a
new trial after the ten day limitation has expired.
If an appeal has been perfected to the court of
appeals, the subsequent filing of a motion for a
new trial is not timely."
Nor can the court's jurisdiction be extended by the
filing of any motion by the plaintiff:
"The seasonable serving of a motion for new
trial did not operate to extend the ten day limit
within which trial court grant new trial on its own
initiative, and hence granted new trail could not be
sustained where motion itself was insufficient,
merely because court stated, as additional grounds
for granting new trial, that court was not satisfied
with the verdict. Marshal's U.S. Auto Supply v.
Cashman, C.C.A. lOth, 1940, 111 F·ed. (2d) 140,
certiorari denied 61 ·s. Ct. 26, 311 U.S. 667, 85 L.
Ed. 428.
"Where ground of inadequacy of damages
had not been assigned in any of plaintiff's motions
but trial judge stated in his opinion damages were
inadequate and for that reason amended motion
for new trial was granted only as to the amount
of damages, the judge acted in initiative of court
within subdivision (d) of this rule and not on motion under subdivisions (a), ('b) thereof, so that an
order granting a new trial which was not made
within ten days after entry of judgment was not
timely. F·reid v. McGrath, 1942, 133 F·ed. (2d) 350,
76 U.S. Ap·p. D.C. 388, mandate recalled 135 Fed.
(2d) 833, 77 U.S.. Ap·p. D.C. 385.
"The time limitation with resp·ect to making
of motions for new trial, applies as well to new
trials granted on the court's initiative, even
though a motion for a new trial has already been
34
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seasonably filed on other grounds, l\icDonalds v.
Dykes, D.C. Pa. 1947, 6 F.R.D. 569."
Of course, if the court does not have any jurisdiction
to enter an order granting a new trial upon the expiration
of ten days after the entry of judgment, then the court
does not have any jurisdiction to modify its order granting a new trial after the ~xpiration of that period, or to
set such an order aside. A case particularly in point,
which arose prior to the enactment of the new Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, but which deals specifically with the
power of the court to modify or vacate its order granting a new trial is Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113 Pac.
1023. In that case, the facts are as follows : ·On the 25th
day of September, 1908, the plaintiff filed in the District
Court a written notice of motion for new trial. The motion was heard and submitted on the 17th day of October,
and on the 28th day of that month, was overruled. On
the 19th day of December, the plaintiff petitioned the
court to grant a rehearing and reargument of plaintiff's
motion for a new trial. On the 21st day of D·ecember,
defendant filed a motion to strike plaintiff's petition
for want of jurisdiction. The motion to strike was denied
and on the 26th day of December, the petition was submitted, and on the 3rd day of Jline, 1909, was also denied.
The question was whether or not the petition for rehearing suspended the finality of the judgment. The court
had this to say :
"But the plaintiff urges that the· finality of
the judgment was suspended by the subsequent
filing of his motion or petition for a rehearing,
and until the overruling of it on the 3rd day of
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June, 1909, we think the District Court had not
the po,ver to entertain such a motion. It is unknown to our practice. In California where the
p-ractice relat.ing to new trials is similar to ours,
it has been firmly established that the court has
no power to reopen the question of granting or
denying a motion for a new trial after disposing
of it. (Holtum v. Greif, 144 Cal. 521, 78 Pac. 11;
Carpenter v. Superior Court, 7:5 Cal. 596, 19 Pac.
174; Egan v. Egan, 90 Cal. 15, 27 Pac. 22; Lang
v. Superior ·Court, 71 Cal. 491, 12 Pac. 306, 416;
Coombs v. Hibberd, 43 Cal. 152). In the first case
the court said :
" 'The question, then, is as to th-e power of
the trial court to vacate an order granting or
denying a new trial after it has once been regularly made and entered. The decisions of this
court are numerous and uniform to the effect that
a judgment or order once regularly entered can
be reviewed and set aside only in the modes prescribed by statute. If they have been entered prematurely, or by inadvertence, they may be set
aside on the p-roper showing (Cases cited), and,
if the order as entered is not the order as made,
the minutes may be corrected so as to make them
speak the truth (Cases cited); but subject to these
exceptions, the order is reviewable only on app·ela, -and, the decision of the trial court having
once been made after regular submission of the
motion, its power is exhausted. * * * It is f11JYl(Jtus

officio.'
''In the second case it was said: 'The function
of this rule is that the modes in which a decision
may be reviewed or prescribed by statute, and the
courts are not at liberty to substitute other modes
in their place. * * *'
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"In the next place, the power of the District
Court to rehear and reexamine the cause was once
invoked by plaintiff's first application for retrial.
After the application was denied, to then also permit her petition to rehear and reexamine the order
denying the motion is in effect to allow the limit
of time within which a motion for a new trial may
'be made to be enlarged and to render the proceedings after judgment interminable. There must be
some point where litigation in the lower court
terminates, and the losing party turned over to
the appellate court for redress (Coombs v. Hibberd, supra).* * *"
The court gave as its authority for setting aside the
order for a new trial, Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. This rule provides among other grounds
that a final order of judgment may be set aside for mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.
It is submitted that the mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect referred to is that of the nature
set out in Luke v. Colemar~A, where the order entered does
not actually represent the order of the court and has been
prematurely entered or entered due to inadvertence or
mistake. However, the court having determined to grant
a new trial on one date, cannot thereafter come along six
months later and vacate its order granting a new trial.
Such a procedure would only encourage the losing party
to harass the trial court after the determination of a
matter to the exent that the court finally in desperation
or otherwise reverses itself. Litigation must end somewhere, and in this case it should have ended with the
granting of a new trial.
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CONCLUSION
Pursuant to an application representing the defendant, Leland Thompson, to be the owner of the property
free from any encumbrances, the plaintiff issued its
policy of insurance insuring the defendant against loss
by fire to a frame dwelling, an Allis Chalmers tractor,
and an Allis Chalmers combine. On November 8, 1952., a
fire occurred in which the ~bove described prop;erty was
damaged or destroyed. Upon p,resentation of a proof
of loss by the defendant representing the defendant to
be the owner of the frame dwelling and that the same
was of value of $2,000, the plaintiff paid to the defendant
the sum of $2,000.
Subsequent to the loss and the payment of the $2,000,
the plaintiff discovered that the defendant was not the
owner of the frame dwelling at the time of the loss, but
that the same had been sold to John M. Hardy on December 18, 1951. An action was brought to recover the $2,000, and upon the trial of that action, it was further discovered that the frame dwelling was not owned by the
defendant at the time the application for insurance was
made, but was leased from the Box Elder County F'arm
Labor Association, and that the Allis Chalmers tractor
was not free from encumbrances but there had been a
loan on the tractor at the time, neither of which situations
had been revealed to the plaintiff. At the time of the trial
it also develop,ed from evidence procured from the defendant's own witnesses that the frame dwelling did not
have a value of $2,000, but that its actual value was $1,000. The case was submitted to the jury upon a special
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verdict, and as a result of that verdict, judgment was
entered upon the defendant's counterclaim for the damages to the tractor and combine and a judgment of no
cause of action was entered on plaintiff's complaint.
The court found as a matter of law that the verdict was
excessive by $1,000, this being the amount the defendant
had been overpaid on the value of the building and ordered a new trial on plaintiff's complaint provided the defendant did not consent to reduce the judgment by that
amount. Upon refusal of the defendant to accept that
amount, the court ordered a new trial on plaintiff's complaint. Six months later the court set aside this order
and the finding that the verdict was excessive and reinstate·d the original judgment.
The misrepresentations made by the defendant as to
the ownership of the property and any encumbrances
thereon were material to the risk, and by reason of the
same, the policy was void, which leads us to the conclusion under the authorities cited in this brief that defendant was not entitled to recover anything by his counterclaim, that the judgment on that counterclaim should
be set aside and another judgment entered that plaintiff
should recover back from defendant $2,000 paid under the
policy.
The plaintiff is entitled to the return of its $2,000
for another reason, namely, that when the defendant
sold his entire interest in the building, his interest in the
building ceased and he no longer had an insurable interest under the p·olicy of insurance, which was vital to his
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recovery. If we are to ~assume that the policy was not
voided by the misrepresentations and that the defendant
did have an insurable interest in the frame building, the
fact still remains that the limit of his recovery was the
$1,000 actual value of the building, the same being the
price for which he sold the building, which the buyer
was willing to p,ay for the same. This issued was raised
by the pleadings, and a finding by the court on this issue
was proper, especially in view of the liberal policy announced by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
state that issues not raised by the pleadings, which are
tried by the express or implied consent of the parties,
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
by the pleadings.
The trial court recognized this and granted a new
trial to the plaintiff upon its complaint, providing that
the defendant would not consent to a reduction of the
judgment by the $1,000, which in his opinion the plaintiff
was entitled to recover. The defendant not consenting,
the new trial was ordered, only to be set aside by the
court six months later, which action we resp,ectfully
submit was beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWART, CANNON & HANSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff 1and
Appellant
520 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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